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STATUTORY COMMENTS
TAKE-OVER BIDS IN VIRGINIA
In recent years there has been an increase in the use of take-over
bids or cash tender offers to gain corporate control.1 Between the
years of 196o and 1966 the number of take-over bids for securities of
corporations listed on both the New York and American Stock Exchanges rose from eight per year to over forty-four per year.2 This
increase was a reflection of the several advantages of a take-over bid
as opposed to other methods of acquiring corporate control: no shareholder approval is necessary as required in a merger3 or the sale of
corporate assets; 4 a smaller portion of the company need be purchased

to acquire corporate control; 5 and the extensive legal documentation
required for mergers and asset purchases is not necessary in a cash
tender offer.6 Perhaps the most important advantage of the take-over
bid was that no disclosure requirements were imposed upon this
method of corporate acquisition. The advantage of secrecy that the
potential acquirer enjoyed resulted in a decided disadvantage to both
'The take-over bid, or cash tender offer, is defined as a public offer by an
offeror other than the corporation itself to purchase all or part of the equity
securities of the corporation. The bid, in the form of an offer to purchase the
shares of a corporation for cash is ordinarily at a price higher than the prevailing
market price, and provides that a certain number of shares be tendered. The
shareholder wishing to accept the offer is said to tender his shares to the offeror
or his designated agent.
See Offer of Matson Navigation Co., United States Freight Co. and Waterman
Indus. Corp. for United States Lines Co., the N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1968, at 58;
Offer of Alleghany Corp. for Jones Motor Co., The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6,
1968, at 17; Offer of International Controls Corp. for Electronic Specialty Co., The
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1968, at 15.
-Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
LAw. 149 (1966).
"An affirmative vote of two-thirds or more of the shares entitled to vote is
required. ALI-ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 67 (1966); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, §
251 (Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-70 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
'A sale of assets may require a two-thirds vote of those shares entitled to vote,
ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 72 (1966); or it may require merely a majority
vote, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (Supp. 1968). Virginia requires a more than twothirds vote. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-77(c) (Supp. 1968).
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 317, 318 (1967).
"Id. at 319.
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the shareholder and the incumbent management of the target corporation.
The general dissatisfaction that this situation produced was expressed by former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen: "In many cases
of cash tender offers... the public investor does not even know the
identity of the purchaser, much less what the purchaser plans to do
with the company if the takeover bid is successful." 7 Thus, under such
circumstances, the shareholder to whom the offer was directed could
not adequately evaluate the effect of a successful take-over bid on the
company and could not, therefore, make an informed decision either
to sell or retain his shares. Similarly, this secrecy worked to the disadvantage of incumbent management, whose jobs might well be affected, but who would not know against whom or what to defend.
The take-over bid initially developed as an alternative method of
acquiring corporate control but soon became the only means that was
not subjected to detailed regulation:
An exchange for shares in a different corporation entails a
sale of those shares within the meaning of the Securities Act
of 1933 and is therefore subject to all the disclosure requirements of that act. A merger (and this would generally be true
of share exchanges as well) is subject to various antitrust laws
and a variety of constraints resulting from the Internal Revenue
Code. Proxy fights are heavily regulated by the SEC's proxy
rules promulgated under Section 14 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8

Thus, as a result of minimal regulation, the use of the take-over bid
became widespread as a primary method of acquiring corporate control. The motivating factor behind such a bid may be: (i) corporate
looting, as evidenced by an immediate liquidation or a sale of assets;
(2) a more acceptable business purpose, such as diversification by the
acquirer or the improvement of management and business activity of
the acquired; or (3) increased stock valuation through the assignment
of a higher price-earning ratio to the acquired company's shares.
Prior to the enactment of Virginia's Take-Over Bid Disclosure
Act9 and the recent amendment to the Federal Securities Exchange
Act of 193410 there was a hiatus in the securities law where an out-

sider attempted to gain control through the use of the take-over bid.
7

Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
LAw. 149, 150 (1966).
Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
DuKE L.J. 231-82.

'Act of March 5,1968, Va. Acts 1968, c. ig.
"OAct of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
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The common law required disclosure only where failure to do so
would constitute a breach of a fiduciary relationship." Rule iob-512
imposes the same requirement upon all corporate insiders.' 3 The
rule concerning outsiders, however, while not clearly articulated, appears to indicate that there is no affirmative duty to disclose. This
rule is illustrated by Mills v. Sarjem Corp.14 where a group of outsiders was able to acquire control of a bridge-owning corporation by
means of a tender offer without disclosing any of their plans. They
then sold the bridge to a waiting buyer for a substantial profit. Former
shareholders of the acquired corporation were held to have no cause
of action under rule iob-5 . The case has been correctly criticized
for the anomalous result that it reaches.
The leading case [Speed v. Transamerica Corp. 99 F. Supp. 8o8
(1951)]

holds that it is unlawful for an insider to purchase

stock without disclosing material facts affecting its value known
to him by virtue of his insider position. In the principal case
[Mills v. Sarjem Corp.], the court draws negative inferences from
this statement and uses it to set the boundaries of recovery.
Thus, only insiders are under a duty to disclose and the information must be gained by virtue of their inside position.
This dubious reasoning does violence to the rule in that it
makes it applicable to far fewer persons than the phrase "any
person" indicates.1
In the more recent case of Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.' 6 the
view that rule iob-5 does not affirmatively require disclosure by outsiders making tender offers was discussed, but no opinion was expressed either to confirm or reject this conclusion. 17 Thus, the present
state of the law indicates that under rule iob-5 an outsider is under
no duty to make disclosures.' 8 Also at common law an affirmative
"Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 219 (909) (dicta).
nRule iob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240lob- 5 (1968) promulgated pursuant to section
so of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule sob-5 requires disclosure by "any
person" but this has been construed as applying only to insiders. For a discussion
of the meaning of insider, see Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
2Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8 (D. Del. 1951). For a discussion
of civil remedies under Rule iob-5, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITES REGULATION. 1455-474
(2d ed. 1961); Note, Rule job-5 : Elements of a Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 541 (1968); The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities Law: A New Challenge for Rule xob- 5 , 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 359 (1966).
"133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
" 54 MicH. L. Rv. 1186-87 (1956).
'384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
"TId. at 544-45.
'Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955); Connelly v. Balkwill,
174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 299 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 196o).
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duty of disclosure was predicated upon the finding of a special relationship between the buyer and the seller.19
The Virginia and federal statutes impose the requirement of full
disclosure upon offerors who would, after successful completion of
the take-over bid, be in a position to exercise or influence control over
the corporation. This requirement is imposed in order to insure that
the shareholder has sufficient information to make an intelligent
appraisal of the effect of a successful take-over both on the company
and on his shares.20 Under both the Virginia statute and the federal
statute with its implementing SEC regulations, the offeror is now
required to file a statement which must contain his identity, his
business background and present holdings in the company, the
source of his funds, 2' the terms and conditions of the offer, any plans
for material changes in the corporation or for changes in directors or
other important personnel, and any contracts or arrangements with
third parties which are relevant to the take-over bid.22 Copies of the
offer and other soliciting material must also be filed before they are
sent to the shareholders. 23 Therefore, the disclosure requirements of
both statutes change the prior law by imposing upon outsiders the
affirmative duty to disclose.
In addition to this requirement both statutes impose regulations
on any recommendations which are made to shareholders to either
'E.g., Strong v. Rapide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F.
Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 299 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1966).
OBoth statutes, with stated exceptions, focus upon the offeror who will own
more than ten per cent of any class of equity security of the target corporation if
their bid is successful. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(i) (Supp. 1969); VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1529(i)

(Supp. 1968).

"'In the event that an offeror has, as a source of his funds, a bank loan
negotiated in the ordinary course of business the Virginia statute requires only that
this fact is so stated. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531 (iii) (Supp. 1968). The regulations
to the federal law, however, require the offeror to disclose the identities of the
parties involved. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. 1969) as implemented by Reg. 14D,
§ 240o14d-1, 33 Fed. Reg. 11017 (1968); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1969).
Professor Manne has predicted that both the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board
would use this information to increase their supervisory powers over Swiss and
United States banks, Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman
Cohen, 1967 DuaE L.J. 231.
22Securities Exchange Act, § 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(i) (Supp. 1969) as implemented
by Reg. 14 D, § 2 4 0.1 4 d-1, 33 Fed. Reg. 11017 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.-531
(Supp. 1968).
"Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1- 5 3 1(b) (Supp. 1968).
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accept or reject the offer.2 4 Both statutes provide for the pro rata
acceptance of shares in the event that more shares are tendered than
the offeror is obligated to purchase 25 as well as providing for a time
period during which the shareholder may withdraw any shares he
has tendered in response to the offer. 26 Also found in both statutes is
the requirement that any increase in the offeror's price after the
bid has been opened be applied pro tanto to all shares already tendered as well as to those tendered afterwards. 27 Provisions outlawing
fraud by either misstatement or partial disclosure, similar to the pro28
visions of rule lob-5, are included in each statute.
29
The Virginia statute provides both civil and criminal sanctions.
Civil liability is imposed upon the offeror and upon every person who
materially aids or participates in the take-over bid, including anyone
who controls the offeror. These persons are considered to be jointly
and severally liable and it is expressly provided that contribution
-IThe regulations to the federal statute require that one making a recommendation to shareholders file a fairly lengthy statement containing his identity,
affiliation with either the offeror or incumbent management, persons employed by
him to make such recommendations, and information on all transactions in the
security by the issuer, its subsidiaries, their personnel and affiliates, within the last
sixty days. The regulation is subject to some exceptions. z5 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(4)
(Supp. 1969) as implemented by Schedule 1413, § 240, 14d-101, 33 Fed. Reg. 11017
(1968). The Virginia statute requires only that such recommendations "be filed
with the Commission not later than the time copies of such solicitation or recommendation are first published or sent or given to [shareholders]." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-532 (Supp. 1968).
'The federal statute imposes this requirement on the offeror only with respect
to shares tendered during the first ten days after the tender offer or a price increase
is announced. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. 1969); the Virginia statute imposes
this requirement on the offeror with respect to all the shares tendered. VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-530(c) (Supp. 1968).
-The federal statute provides for shareholder withdrawal during the first seven
days of the offer and any time after the offer has been open for sixty days. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. 1969). The Virginia law allows for shareholder withdrawal any time during the first twenty-one days of an offer, which can last for a
maximum of only thirty-five days. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.l-53o(a) (Supp. 1968).
'"Both statutes require that a price increase made while the bid is open be
applied to all shares tendered during that bid and eventually purchased. 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78n(d)(7) (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § i3.i-53o(d) (Supp. 1968). Because both
statutes speak in terms of a single bid, a literal reading would permit an offeror
to save this price increase until a later bid and avoid paying the increase to early
tendering shareholders. Under the federal statute it might be claimed that the
two offers were actually one, but this would be difficult to claim under the Virginia statute in view of the section limiting take-over bids to a maximum of thirtyfive days. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-530(a) (Supp. 1968). For a situation in which this
problem existed but was not litigated, see Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230
A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
25 U.S.C.A. 78n(e) (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. 13.1-533 (Supp. 1968).
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-536, -539 (Supp. 1968).
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shall be allowed.3 0 However, any of the parties except the offeror may
escape liability providing he is able to establish that "he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged
to exist." 3'

The remedy provided for shareholders is the return of

32
their tendered shares together with dividends and attorney's fees. If
the defendant no longer owns the shares, the shareholder will be
entitled to damages.33 There is a two year statute of limitations on
civil actions, and the prospective defendant may escape liability by

34
offering to return the shares prior to commencement of the suit.

It is questionable, however, if the above penalties would apply to
a violation of the statute's recommendation provision. The civil
liabilities section, by its express terms, applies only to infractions
of the actual take-over bid and disclosure requirements. 3 5 It cannot
be said with certainty whether this result was intended or was merely
a legislative oversight. However, it is specifically provided that the
statutory rights are in addition to any other rights and remedies
that would exist either at law or in equity;3 6 therefore, a person
aggrieved by an infraction of the recommendation provision would
not be entirely without recourse.
Enforcement power of the criminal sanctions under the Virginia
statute is given to the State Corporation Commission, which may
conduct investigations at the offeror's expense.3 7 The State Corporation Commission is also given the power of a court of record to
issue both temporary and permanent injunctions and to punish, by
contempt, any violation of these injunctions.3 8 In addition, the Commission may prosecute any violation as a misdemeanor,3 9 or conduct
its own hearings and punish proven violations by a fine of up to
five thousand dollars.4 0 Unlike the civil remedies provided by the
statute, the criminal sanctions apply to any violation of the Act in41
cluding a violation of the recommendation provision.
"'VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-539(b) (Supp. 1968).

WId.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-539(a)(2)(i) (Supp. 1968).
CODE ANN. § 13.1-539(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1968).
CODE ANN. § 13.1- 5 3 9 (d) (Supp. 1968).
CODE ANN. § 13.1-539 (Supp. 1968).
CODE ANN. § 13.1-539() (Supp. 1968).
-VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-534 (Supp. 1968).
38VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-535 (Supp. 1968).

"VA.
"VA.
"VA.
"VA.
OVA.

"0VA. CODE ANN. §

i.1-536 (Supp. 1968).

"°VA. CODE ANN. § 13.I-537 (Supp. 1968).
41VA. CODE ANN. § I.1-536 (Supp. 1968).
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The federal statute does not provide for civil remedies. However,
private rights of action have been held to exist under section 14 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42 Therefore, it may be predicted
that the private right of action would also apply to this amendment.
Because of the affirmative duty to disclose, this amendment should
greatly extend the liability of the tender offeror, who was previously
liable, if at all, under rule iob-5.43 The amendment, as the rest of
the Act, is enforceable by SEC prosecution. 44
Despite the nearly identical nature of the information required to
be disclosed under each statute, and despite the similar imposition of
an affirmative duty of disclosure upon an outside offeror, there are
significant differences between the two laws. The Virginia statute
appears to favor incumbent management to a much greater extent
than does the federal law, and may severely restrict the use of takeover bids for Virginia corporations. Congress, however, recognized
that take-over bids do provide for a useful check on entrenched but
inefficient management, and it was the stated design of the federal
statute "to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal
opportunity to fairly present their case." 45 Therefore, in comparing
the two statutes and exploring the effect they will have on take-over
bids in Virginia, it is important to consider their effect on the relative
advantage between incumbent management and the offeror as well
as the benefits which will accrue to the shareholders in the form of
added information.
The first major difference relates to the filing time of the offeror's
disclosure and the target corporation's response. The Virginia statute
requires that the offeror file his disclosure statement with both the
State Corporation Commission and the registered agent of the target
company at least ten days before the offer is made public. 46 Recommendations to shareholders either to accept or reject the offer, however, need only be filed with the State Corporation Commission before or at the same time they are sent. 47 Although it may appear that
'Borak v. J. I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
' 3See Note, Rule iob-5 : Elements of a Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L.
RLv. 541 (1968).
i15 U.S.C. § 78u (1964).
45u.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2813 (1968).
"'At least ten days prior to the making of a take-over bid, the offeror shall file
with the Commission and with the registered agent of the offeree [target] company
a statement containing the following information...." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-531(a)
(Supp. 1968).
7

' VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-532 (Supp. 1968).
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these provisions were intended to give incumbent management a ten
day start to defend against the take-over bid while the offeror's hands
are tied, a literal reading of the statute allows anyone, including the
offeror, to take advantage of the recommendation provision:
Any written solicitation or recommendation to offerees to
accept or reject a take-over bid shall be filed with the Commission not later than the time copies of such solicitation or
48
recommendation are first published or sent or given to offerees.
If this interpretation were adopted by the courts, an offeror would
be able to file his required disclosure statement and, on the same day,
file and send to shareholders a recommendation that they accept the
take-over bid which will be made public in ten days. Presumably the
offeror could not be too explicit in his recommendation as the
courts could interpret the recommendation as nothing more than a
part of the offer itself and therefore subject to the same ten-day waiting period. In the event a court did interpret such a recommendation
as part of an actual offer and found that the ten-day waiting period
between filing and publication had not been observed, the offeror
would be in violation of the Virginia statute and subject to both the
criminal and the civil sanctions. Moreover the injunctive provision of
the Virginia statute could be invoked to enjoin the tender offer where
the violation precedes the actual making of the take-over bid.
It would seem reasonable, however, to allow an offeror to prepare
the investing public for his forthcoming offer by means of some statement made pursuant to the recommendation section of the Virginia
statute, provided that such statement or recommendation by the offeror
does not constitute an offer. 49 If the immediate use of this recommendation provision is a windfall to the offeror not intended by the
Virginia Legislature, it can be corrected by amendment. However,
the benefit that this provision bestows upon the outside offeror
appears to be small in comparison to the benefit it bestows upon incumbent management, because an outside offeror is seldom in a position
to have immediate access to the stockholder list of the corporation.50
48Id.
"DSuch a preliminary recommendation would be closely analagous to the socalled "tombstone advertisement" allowed with respect to new security issues under
the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (io) (1964); H.R. Rep. No. 1542,
8 3 d Cong., 2d Sess 21 (1954).

5OAn outsider has no right to see the corporate records unless he owns stock
in the corporation, and even then he is subject to the restrictions, both legal and
practical, of "reasonable time" and "proper purpose". VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-47
(Repl. Vol. 1964). See also Bank of Giles County v. Mason, 199 Va. 176, 98 S.E.2d
905 (1957)-

1969]

STATUTORY COMMENTS

Thus, while incumbent management can use the corporate facilities
and stockholder lists to significant advantage during this prepublication period of a tender offer by sending personal letters of recommendation to selected shareholders, the offeror is limited and at best
can publish only an impersonal statement.
Other devices available to management to combat an attempted
take-over must be carefully scrutinized in light of the fiduciary duty
owed by management to the corporation and in view of increasing
restrictions on the action of insiders. Thus, the issuance of previously
authorized shares or the sale of treasury shares may not only be subject
to pre-emptive rights,51 but may be improper as a device to protect
management. 2 Purchases of outstanding shares by either management
or the corporation without full disclosure may be actionable under
either the common law5 3 or rule lob-5 .54 Even the deliberate release
of favorable corporate news may be actionable due to the expansive
language used in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf
Sulpher Co. . Management would be on firmer ground in exercising
existing stock options and using their individual and collective powers
of persuasion on the shareholders. Any use of corporate funds must,
of course, be justified for a corporate purpose as opposed to merely
a personal one. 56
Under the federal law this ten day period does not exist because
the offeror's statement and soliciting materials are not required to be
filed until the offer is actually made public. 5 7 In addition, more in-

formation is required from persons making recommendations than
the mere filing of the recommendation required by Virginia. Under
the federal statute these persons must file a statement containing
substantially the same information required of the offeror in his
disclosure statement.5 8 Thus, in the event of a contested take-over bid,
the federal statute starts both parties off at the same time and under
nearly equal conditions, while the Virginia law, depending upon the
"Pre-emptive rights on common stock not issued for services or property other
than money exist in Virginia corporations unless limited or abolished in the
articles of incorporation. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-23 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
12
See Ross Trans., Inc. v. Grothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946).
rStrong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (19o9); Agatucci v. Corradi, 327 Ill. App. 153,
63 N.E.2d 63o (1945).
" Note, SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchases of Securities, 59 HARV. L.
RrV. 769, 779 (1946).
r-4oi F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
roSee Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
ni5 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. 1969).
rsi 5 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. 1969) as implemented by Reg. i 4 D, § 240.14d- 4 ,
33 Fed. Reg. 11017 (1968).
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interpretation favored by the courts, may allow incumbent management a ten day start in its effort to contest the take-over bid.
A second major difference concerns the period during which the
shareholder is bound by the tender offer, and cannot withdraw any
of the tendered shares. Here, too, Virginia favors existing management
to a much greater extent than the federal law. The Virginia statute
allows for the withdrawal of shares at any time during the first twentyone days of the take-over bid. 59 This twenty-one day period, coupled
with the ten day waiting period, would allow incumbent management
thirty-one days from the time they were first notified of the impending
bid until any of their shareholders would be bound in their tender
to the offeror: thirty-one days in which to oppose the insurgents. In
addition to the twenty-one day withdrawal provision, the Virginia
statute also provides that no take-over bid may last longer than thirtyfive days. 0 These two provisions cut the effective duration of a takeover bid to fourteen days, for it is only between the twenty-first and
thirty-fifth days that the offeror can collect binding tenders from the
shareholders.
The federal statute, however, allows for shareholder withdrawal
only during the first seven days and after sixty days. 61 It was the
opinion of Congress that these withdrawal periods would allow the
shareholder to change his mind at the outset when the differing
points of view became known and would also prevent the offeror from
keeping the shares tied up for an excessive length of time.0 2 These
provisions allow the offeror fifty-three days, as compared to Virginia's
fourteen, to collect binding tenders from the shareholders. Thus, the
Virginia law is more strict on the offeror than is the federal law
because under the Virginia law the offeror has less than one-third as
many days to collect binding tenders from shareholders.
To the extent that the two statutes are not in conflict, each is valid
and may be applied in its own sphere, provided that no plaintiff recovers more than the total amount of his damages in a civil suit. 3
r'"Shares deposited pursuant to a take-over bid may be withdrawn by an
offeree or his attorney in fact by demand in writing on the offeror or the depository
at any time within twenty-one days from the date of the first invitation to deposit
shares." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1- 5 3o(b) (Supp. 1968).

w'The period of time within which shares may be deposited pursuant to a
take-over bid shall not be less than twenty-one days nor more than thirty-five
days from the date of the first invitation to deposit shares." VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-53o(a) (Supp. 1968).

115U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. 1969).
03U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NFvs 282o (1968).

615 U.S.C. § 7 8bb(a) (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-539 (Supp. 1968).
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If the two conflict, however, the federal statute must supersede the
state statute. 64 Such conflicts could arise out of overlapping jurisdiction and inconsistent provisions, as noted hereafter.
The Virginia statute applies whenever the offeree corporation is
incorporated under the laws of Virginia and doing business within the
state. 65 There is no restriction on the size of the company nor on the
extent of its activities conducted outside of Virginia. 60 The federal
statute applies to any company, provided that the particular security
covered by the take-over bid is required to be registered under Section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 6 7 or was issued by a closedend investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940.08 It is obvious, therefore, that any Virginia corporation
whose securities are registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 will be subject to the requirements of both
statutes.
Because some take-over bids will be subject to both Virginia and
federal regulation, and because there are differences in the two statutes,
the question of federal pre-emption and supremacy may arise. However,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, by its own terms, 69 negates any
inference that the Act was intended to pre-empt the field of securities
regulation. Since the federal statue concerning take-over bids is an
amendment to the 1934 Act, and because Congress expressed no intent
to pre-empt the field in this recent amendment, the statutory provision
negating pre-emption must necessarily apply to the amendment as
well as to the rest of the 1934 Act. Therefore, the state law must be
deemed valid unless it is found to be in actual conflict with the federal
statute.
The current test by which courts decide whether or not a state
statute conflicts with a federal statute so as to be invalid is set forth
70
by the recent cases of Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
CU.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
-VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(e) (Supp. x968).

',The Virginia statute does exempt several types of securities and transactions
from its provisions. However, these exemptions are relatively restricted in their
application to the ordinary tender offer. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-52 9 (b) (Supp. 1968).
6
"Registration is required of most corporations listed on a national exchange,
as well as most corporations with five hundred shareholders and Si,oooooo total
assets. 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(B) (Supp. 1969).
0
lnvestment companies, excluded from the registration requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, are required to register under this Act. 15
U.S.C. § Soa-8 (1964).
OD15U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
70362 U.S. 440 (196o).
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and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter.71 In Huron the United
States Supreme Court held that there was no conflict between a city
anti-pollution ordinance and a federal steam vessel inspection statute
stating that: "[T]o hold otherwise would be to ignore the teaching
of this Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts between
state and federal regulation where none clearly exists." 72 The Court
quoted from the same passage in Seagram and indicated that a "conflict" between statutes would exist only if a party would be forced
73
or induced to violate one law in his effort to comply with the other.
If this test is applied to the two significant differences between the
statutes under discussion, it will be evident that there is no "conflict"
within the meaning of Huron and Seagram cases. With respect to the
first difference, that of the ten-day discrepancy in filing times for
offerors, there would be no conflict because an offeror, under the Virginia law, who filed ten days before making his tender offer, would
not be forced to file after the deadline as imposed under the federal
law and there is no prohibition under the federal statute against filing
early. Similarly, the Virginia statute's more permissive withdrawal
provision and thirty-five day limitation on the offer itself should not
present a conflict sufficient to invalidate the state law. Here, too, the
federal statute provides only minimum requirements, and the state
may raise these requirements in its own law without forcing or inducing any violation of the federal law. The same analysis applies to
the state and federal provisions concerning banks as lenders,74 but
in the reverse. Here the federal law requires the disclosure of information concerning a bank loan which is a source of capital to the tender
offeror while the Virginia law does not. Because the Virginia law does
not prohibit such disclosure it is not superceded by the federal law.
The case which most directly supports the conclusion that no conflict exists is Crosby v. Weil,75 in which a cause of action was based
upon an alleged violation of the Illinois securities law. Stock not registered under the state statute, was sold to plaintiff, who claimed that the
defendant's noncompliance with the state statute made the defendant
liable under state law. The defendant pointed out that he had registered the stock under the federal statute and claimed that he did not
have to comply with the state law as he had complied with the federal
law which pre-empted the state law. However, the court held that
'1384 U.S. 35 (1966)2362 U.S. at 446.
'384 U.S. at 45.
7'See note 21 supra.
7382 Ill. 538, 48 N.E.2d 386 (1943).
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there was no pre-emption absent conflict between the state and federal statutes because section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 specifically stated that Congress did not intend to pre-empt state
statutes. The court then said that there was no conflict because the
Illinois statute was not clearly repugnant to the federal law. 76 Thus,
in Crosby, as in the present situation, the state statute was more strict
than the federal statute and would prohibit stock issues (tender offers)
which the federal law would not prohibit; that is, when a federal law
sets minimum standards the state is not prohibited from setting higher
standards. The holding in Crosby would apparently apply by analogy
to any contention that the federal statute has pre-empted the Virginia
77
Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act.

Existing Virginia law by analogy tends to corroborate the conclusion above and to uphold the validity of the Virginia statute.7 8
Should conflict be found, however, the Virginia statute has a sever79
ability clause which would save all but the conflicting sections.
The newly enacted statutes do indeed fill a hiatus in securities law
by imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure upon outside take-over
bids. The shareholder will be able to evaluate his alternatives more
intelligently and incumbent management will be protected against
surprise bids for control. The initial position of equality between the
offeror and incumbent management which was so carefully preserved
by Congress sO is not, however, evident in the Virginia law. Because
the rather pronounced favoritism toward incumbent management was
not necessary to the disclosure of all pertinent information to the
shareholder, it is submitted that the Virginia statute while attempting
to cure one evil creates only another-the further entrenchment of
inefficient corporate management. This may be detrimental to shareholders of Virginia corporations in that they alone may not enjoy
the full effectiveness of the federal statute.
STEPHEN S. CASE

'0382 Ill. 538, 48 N.E.2d 386, 390-91 (1943).

1See also Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Traveler's
Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949), aJJ'd, 339 U-S.
643 (195o) in which the activities of a foreign insurance corporation with no agent
in the state were held subject to the Virginia Securities Act and no pre-emption
by the federal act was found.
76Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
afJ'd, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-541 (Supp. 1968).
'°U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2813 (1968).

